Avionics News May 2018 - 14

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
Continued from page 13

they are not certified via TSO, but they
are absolutely certified and approved for
their intended purpose. In most cases, the
new products have been certified under
the PMA rules, the same rules we have
used for in-flight entertainment systems,
Wi-Fi systems, and LED lighting systems
as well as thousands of other products.
The TSOed approach is a certification
intended for broad-based installations,
therefore, requiring a design and certification for the most-complex aircraft,
while the STC and PMA approach of the
new products is a focused certification
for a specific aircraft installation (usually
less complex than the targeted TSO candidate). This focused installation allows
for a more-specific certification: The
product is certified for a specific aircraft
(Cessna 172) or group of aircraft (Piper
PA-28 Series) while a TSOed product
may be certified for an entire category
(Part 25) or multiple categories (Part
23, 25, 27, and 29). Because these new
products are certificated to a specific aircraft, the installation limitations of these
new products are quite different than the
more-general, broad-based installation
authority of TSOed products, and unfortunately, understanding and applying
these limitations falls on the installer.
So how did we get here? I'm really
not sure. My best estimate is that sometime around the time of the general aviation industry restart supported by the
1994 General Aviation Revitalization
Act (Public Law 103-298) and the 1995
Suspected Unapproved Parts report,
airframe manufacturers started asking
component manufacturers to build to
a TSO if a TSO existed. Then, over
time, that became the norm, and a new
generation of industry and FAA engineers assumed that if a TSO existed,
you MUST produce to the TSO. But
the regulations never changed and
never supported these assumptions.
Nonetheless, while never supported
by the regulations, TSO production
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avionics news

may

2018

became the industry accepted norm.
In the 1980s and 1990s, we didn't pay
a penalty for following the norm. The
mechanical technology of most avionics
and the analog technology of radios were
fairly standard from the most-complex
commercial jetliner to the most-basic
recreational aircraft. However, as digital
technology advanced throughout the
2000s and the design and certification
standards were focused on the mostcomplex commercial aircraft, the general
aviation market began to pay an extraordinarily high price for these new technologies while the non-certified aircraft
market was booming.
So breaking tradition, proving the
norm to be wrong, was the challenge.
Nearly seven years ago, I began debating with FAA leadership. Being told
I was wrong, I challenged the agency
personnel to show me where I was
wrong. After nearly a year of constant
debate, they started to acquiesce. They
acknowledged that perhaps their narrow
reading of the regulations was possibly
wrong, and that the current regulations,
properly interpreted, might just lead to
bridging the widening gap between available modern technology products in the
experimental community and the certified recreational aircraft markets. Slowly,
the agency started to look for applicants
to challenge the status quo and invest in
this new philosophy.
During this time, I continued to preach
the gospel of change. I met with nearly
every manufacturer of GA avionics,
every major general aviation association,
and I even met with the entrepreneurs of
the experimental aircraft community. I
would show them the options that were
available; encourage their use of all the
regulatory tools; encourage them to push
back on the status quo. And every time
the response was the same: The FAA -
my FAA - won't let me.
When the FAA identified a low-cost
angle of attack instrument as a solution to mitigate loss of control, I called
a meeting with my staff manager at
ASTM. Within 15 minutes, we had pro-

posed a change to the scope of ASTM
Committee F39 to include avionics systems. Then, 18 months later, the committee developed and published the ASTM
standard for angle of attack indicators.
This followed in 2014 with the FAA's
acceptance of the standard for the design
and production of AOA indicators for
supplemental use. This became the first
generation of the "non-certificated" parts
movement.
Following the publication of the AOA
standard, ASTM Committee F39 continued its work on avionics systems and
developed a standard for the validation of
simple systems that use software.
While I wasn't involved in the certification of generation 2 of these new products - the EAA STC for the Dynon D10
- I was aware of HOW they did it. There
was not a "secret sauce." The EAA, as
well as the FAA certification engineers,
both members of the earlier Part 23 ARC
working group, were using the certification regulations that we had debated
nearly three years earlier at the Part 23
ARC meetings. In addition, the applicant
(EAA) chose to use the new ASTM system validation standard rather than the
traditional RTCA method of compliance
to validate the system and software.
Generation 3 of the new products
formalized the standards and regulations
supporting the non-required equipment
approved in the generation 1 AOA indicators. Again, leveraging the regulatory
debates and challenges of the continued
airworthiness working group of the Part
23 rulemaking committee as well as
the recognition of industry consensus
standards as an acceptable means of
compliance for the design and certification of safety-enhancing equipment. The
NORSEE policy also leveraged a recommendation from our working group to
use the "or other means acceptable to the
administrator" clause that existed in 14
CFR 21.8 and was added to 14 CFR 21.9
during the Part 23 rulemaking.
Generation 4 - the certification and
production of the Garmin G5 - formalized the EAA concept but from a manu-

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of Avionics News May 2018